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FOREIGN LAW INSPIRING NATIONAL LAW.
LESSONS FROM GREATOREX V. GREATOREX
BASIL MARKESINIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
HERE we are not talking of recourse to foreign law because the
parties chose it, or because it has to be applied because it is so
decreed by the rules of private international law. Nor are we
referring to the law coming from such courts as that of Strasbourg
or Luxembourg; not least because, nowadays, this cannot be
properly called ‘‘foreign’’ law. Here we are focusing only on the
voluntary use by judge or counsel of foreign law and foreign legal
ideas as a means of shaping national law when this is unclear,
contradictory, or otherwise in need of reform. The number of
instances in which this kind of borrowing may happen must, of
necessity, be limited, though in intellectual terms such conscious
transplants must always be exciting to attempt. Yet in a shrinking
world in which increased movement of people and ideas is making
the convergence of tastes, habits, practices and, even, the law more
and more pronounced, this phenomenon can only increase in
signiﬁcance not decrease.
For a long time the present author has tried to encourage this
trend of planned judicial borrowings.1 An open mind must, surely, be
a pre-requisite for any academic; an ability to borrow solutions—
‘‘ready made’’ so to speak—must also be attractive to practitioners
when faced with novel issues. The problem is that foreign law is
unlikely to come in a simple form, attractively packaged; and
language is by no means the only or even major problem in such
attempts to be inspired by a foreign idea if not transplant the actual
solution. That is how one was led to the idea of advocating a more
co-ordinated use of the diﬀerent talents that judges, practitioners,
and academics bring to the process of creating and interpreting law.2
* Professor of Common Law and Civil Law at University College London; Jamail Regents
Chair, University of Texas at Austin.
1 A Collection of Essays published in two volumes, entitled Foreign Law and Comparative
Methodology: A Subject and a Thesis (Oxford 1997) and Always on the Same Path, Essays on
Foreign Law and Comparative Methodology (Oxford 2001) have striven to construct a workable
approach.
2 A beautifully phrased but not entirely convincing formulation can be found in Sir Robert
Megarry’s judgment in Cordell v. Second Clanﬁeld Properties [1969] 2 Ch. 9, 16ﬀ.
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Three decades of teaching foreign law and trying to develop a
workable theory of comparative methodology has had its ups and
downs. Many of the diﬃculties are, I think, linked to the attitude
adopted by my fellow-comparatists who have tried to shape wider
theories about legal transplants or their impossibility. Great names
have contributed to this debate: Alan Watson is one; and he brings
to bear on the subject his knowledge of history as well as many
cultures. More sceptical, Pierre Legrand has ﬂourished amidst the
controversy he has skilfully generated around his theories. My
approach has steered clear from such grand schemes. It has been
pragmatic and judge and practitioner oriented rather than tried to
capture the imagination of fellow academics. This is only partly
because I am working in a Common law environment where the
judge is, as it was once said, the ‘‘senior partner in the law creating
process.’’ But my methodology has also been shaped by the visible
decline experienced by the subject in the classrooms. If one could
only get judges interested in foreign law, practitioners would have to
use it. And they could not use it without some help and preparation
from academics. The subject would thus be revived; and its revival
would also stimulate another favourite cause of mine: the greater
collaboration between academics and practitioners.
The approach I have been advocating seems to have found an
excellent practical illustration in the judgment of the High Court in
Greatorex v. Greatorex.3 The facts of the case were relatively
simple. For in that case a young man, whom, as note eight below
explains, we shall henceforth call D2, was injured in an accident
caused by his own grossly negligent driving. P, his father, a
professional ﬁre oﬃcer stationed nearby, suﬀered serious post-
traumatic stress disorder as a result of attending his unconscious
son at the scene of the accident. The question was whether the
father could claim damages for his harm from the driver/injured
son or, since he was uninsured, from the Motor Insurance Bureau,
which stepped into the gap and became the second defendants in
the action. In his judgment for the defendants Mr. Justice Cazalet
made bold, even interesting, use of foreign law. Yet thus far his
judgment has been only the subject of one case note;4 and from a
comparative point of view, it has not received anywhere near the
attention given to Lord Goﬀ’s opinion in White v. Jones.5 Why this
is so can, for the time being, be left open to speculation. But
without any disrespect to Mr. Justice Cazalet it might be legitimate
3 [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1976.
4 Peter Handford, ‘‘Psychiatric Damage Where the Defendant is the Immediate Victim’’ (2001)
117 L.Q.R. 397, comparing the result with the more generous Australian law.
5 [1995] 2 A.C. 207, 252ﬀ.
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to ponder whether in law, as in other activities in life, the
importance attached to a pronouncement can depend more on the
status and proﬁle of its maker than on its own intrinsic value. This
is unfortunate, for it means that valuable ideas may be ignored
until they are considered or adopted by an appellate court.
Whatever the answer to this wider question, the fact remains that
in terms of comparative law and methodology Mr. Justice Cazalet’s
judgment is, in some respects, more signiﬁcant than Lord Goﬀ ’s
obiter dicta ruminations in White v. Jones. For, unlike White,
where foreign law embellished an opinion of a high-proﬁle judge
but did not inﬂuence it directly,6 in Greatorex foreign law formed
an important part of the argument of both counsels’ submissions as
well as the decision of the judge. The outcome is as interesting as
the way it came about. For this decision can be seen as the result
of a de facto collaboration between the three sides of the legal
profession.
The discussion will be undertaken under four headings: (a) the
German model; (b) its application to the English case; (c)
unresolved questions; (d) further ideas from America. The four sub-
headings or themes will then be brought together in the form of
some tentative conclusions of wider import.
II. THE GERMAN MODEL
The case that ﬁgured prominently in Greatorex was the decision of
the German Federal Supreme Court of 11 May 1971.7 The facts of
the case were simple. On 6 March 1965, when he was sixty-four
years old, the plaintiﬀ’s husband (henceforth referred to as D28)
was fatally injured in a collision with the defendant’s motor vehicle
caused partly by his fault and partly by that of the defendant.
(Henceforth we shall refer to this ‘‘primary’’ defendant as D1.) The
6 For doubts about the practical utility of the foreign law references in Lord Goﬀ’s judgment,
see Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, ‘‘Savigny in the Strand’’, in The Maurice Kelly Memorial
Lecture 1995, esp. pp. 24–25; Neil Duxbury, Jurists and Judges (Oxford 2001), p. 107.
7 BGHZ 56, 163¼NJW 1971, 1883¼VersR 1971, 905, 1140, taken from the third edition of
Markesinis, The German Law of Torts: A Comparative Introduction (1994) (translation by Tony
Weir). The German decision is still the subject of controversy not so much for its result but for
the way it chose to justify it. Its status as ‘‘good law’’ has also been thrown into doubt after
the decision of the Federal Court of 1 March 1988, BGHZ 103, 338, which is mentioned
several times in the discussion that follows. For a summary of the academic views, see
Staudinger/Hager, Kommentar zum BGB, Unerlaubte Handlungen, B39.
8 D2 is the primary victim of the accident; but because he may, through his own negligence, also
have contributed to his hurt and the loss of P (secondary victim), he may be sued by the main
tortfeasor (D1) for a contribution or an indemnity. In Germany D2 can also be referred to as
the ‘‘privileged defendant’’, for he may beneﬁt from an exemption clause arising from his
relations with the plaintiﬀ or he may enjoy an immunity ex lege because of his family
relationship with P. As we shall note later, one of the questions that may arise in such cases is
whether D2’s ‘‘immunity’’ from action by P can also protect him against an action brought by
D1—the joint tortfeasor.
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plaintiﬀ in this case (henceforth P) was the ﬁfty-year old wife of D2
(the primary victim of the accident). In her suit against the
tortfeasor, she claimed damages for the injury to her health, which
she suﬀered when told 9 of the death of her husband, D2. The
Landgericht allowed the claim in full, the Oberlandesgericht in part.
P appealed with permission to the Federal Supreme Court, and her
appeal was allowed. The judgments below were vacated, and the
case remanded to the Oberlandesgericht.
The case involved a claim for what we, in England, now call
psychiatric damage.10 Naturally, one is inclined to say, it also
touched upon some of the usual questions that we, too, have
encountered in this part of the law and, it seems, are unable to
solve through the courts.11 How German law handled the shock
aspect of the claim is not the subject of discussion in this essay
since the matter has been discussed in detail elsewhere.12 But the
second part of the German case addressed the question of D2’s
contributory negligence and how this would/should aﬀect P’s claim.
The German court’s approach need only be reported in its bare
essentials and to the extent that it bears on what is the main theme
of this article. Understandably, D1’s contention was that P’s claim
should be reduced to take into account D2’s contributory fault.
One way to do this was to attempt to rely upon x 846 BGB, which
states that
If, in the cases provided by xx 844, 845, some fault of the
injured party had contributed to cause the damage which the
third party has sustained, the provision of x 254 BGB [about
contributory negligence] applies to the claim of the third party.
The problem with such an approach, however, lies in the italicised
section of this paragraph which refers to what is, in essence, the
German equivalent to our Fatal Accident Acts as amended in 1982.
In fact, x 846 BGB provides precisely the same kind of answer that
9 In principle, German law allows recovery for ‘‘distant’’ psychiatric injury. In practice,
however, such claims are kept under control by judges—no juries exist in German law—
rigorously checking their standard requirement that the ‘‘shock be an appropriate and
understandable consequence’’ of the accident that befell the primary victim. In practice a close
relationship (Schicksalsgemeinshaft) between the plaintiﬀ’s shock and the primary victim is of
paramount importance. A further restriction can be seen from the reasoning of the court
given below.
10 Attia v. British Gas Plc [1988] Q.B. 304, 317 per Bingham L.J. (as he then was).
11 This, at least, seems to be the view of Lord Steyn who argued that the subject might have
now passed the stage of redemption by the courts and needs legislative intervention. See his
opinion in Frost v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 A.C. 455, 500. It is
submitted that W v. Essex County Council [2001] 2 A.C. 592, has compounded the
uncertainty.
12 Markesinis, The German Law of Torts: A Comparative Treatise, 4th ed. by Basil Markesinis
and Hannes Unberath, (Oxford 2002), pp. 45ﬀ. Note, however, that this was a case of
‘‘distant shock’’ which would thus not be compensated by English and (most) American
courts.
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we accept in fatal accident claims: the deceased’s negligence aﬀects
the claims of the dependants. But in this case, so far as the wife’s
claim for psychiatric injury was concerned, it was not a fatal
accidents claim but a direct personal claim based on x 823 I BGB,
not on the fatal accidents legislation. This was a crucial twist. The
German court thus took the view—rightly it is suggested—that the
application of x 846 BGB was not available, even for an analogical
extension.
With the wife (P) claiming not as dependant but in her own right,
for her own psychiatric damage as injury to her health under x 823 I
BGB, D1’s attempt to mitigate the extent of his liability seemed
optimistic. For, if P’s claim was original and not derivative—terms
hinted at by the German decision but, as we shall note later,
excessively relied upon by American cases—her demand that her
damages remain undiminished by her husband’s (D2’s) negligence
looked unshakeable. Yet the German court, invoking the catch-all
clause of good faith contained in the celebrated x 242 BGB, decided
to reduce her damages in proportion to D2’s fault. Thus, for our
purposes, the relevant part of the judgment reads as follows:
Here the accident to her husband was only able to cause the
harm supposedly suﬀered by the plaintiﬀ because as a result of
their close personal relationship his tragedy became hers. One
cannot imagine a person suﬀering in this manner on hearing a
fatal accident to a total stranger; indeed, if it happened, it
would be so unusual that one would decline to impute it to the
defendant on the ground that it was unforeseeable. But if the
critical reason of the plaintiﬀ ’s suﬀering this injury to her
health was her close personal relationship to her husband it
was thus only fair that her claim should be aﬀected by his
fault in contributing to the accident.
This reasoning was further reinforced by (what we would call)
an obiter dictum that was to prove crucial in the Greatorex
litigation.13 For the German court added that:
If the husband’s death had been solely attributable to his
failure to take care of himself, the plaintiﬀ would have had no
13 In such factual situations the court can normally rely on x 1359 BGB to bar any action by
the wife against her husband (or, in this case, his estate). This is because x 1359 states that
one spouse is liable to the other only if he (or she) failed to attain ‘‘the degree of care which
they are accustomed to exercise in their own aﬀairs’’. So the spouse sued can avoid liability if
he can show that in his own aﬀairs he would have displayed a lower standard of care than
that required by ordinary negligence. (A similar rule can be found in x 1664 1 BGB dealing
with the parent/child relations). The rationale of both provisions is to avoid legal disputes
between persons who are in such close family relationships and in many respects draws on the
policy reasons, which were also touched upon by Cazalet J. in Greatorex. The immunity rule
just described does not, however, apply where D2’s fault amounted to gross negligence.
Another limitation on this rule is that it is not applicable in car accident cases. For these
points and the eﬀect they may have had on the reasoning of the German court see section VI
below.
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claim whatever for compensation for the consequent injury to
herself. A person is under no legal duty, whatever the moral
position may be, to look after his own life and limb simply in
order to save the dependants from the likely psychical eﬀects
on them if he is killed or maimed. To impose such a legal
duty, except in very peculiar cases, for instance, wherever a
person commits suicide in a deliberately shocking manner,
would be to restrict a person’s self-determination in a manner
inconsistent with our legal system.
To the above rule the only exception that some authors14 are
prepared to make is in the context of suicide. Suicide may provoke
rescue, especially in a system where the duty to rescue others is
recognised by law.15 Thus they have argued that a person wishing to
commit suicide may be under a duty to carry out the suicide in a way
which does not ‘‘provoke’’ any rescue by third parties; otherwise he
may be liable for any damage suﬀered during the rescue. But the
point does not appear to have been settled by the courts and the
above amounts to little more than academic speculation.16
III. THE APPLICATION OF THE GERMAN IDEAS TO GREATOREX
Prior to Greatorex common law courts do not appear to have faced
the problem squarely of contributory negligence in the context of
nervous shock—at any rate in England—though in his judgment
Cazalet J. alluded to some inconclusive Commonwealth authority.17
In the context of nervous shock, the picture in the United States
may not be much clearer, though Dillon v. Legg contains some
seemingly confused views on the subject.18 However, the same point
about contributory negligence has also arisen in ‘‘rescue’’ cases, and
in those US States which recognise actions for ‘‘loss of consortium
14 See Medicus, Schuldrecht, Besonderer Teil, 9th ed. (Munich 1999) p. 302.
15 So long as the rescue can be rendered without any danger to the rescuer: x 323c StGB.
16 Presumably, the same argument could be advanced in other systems (such as the French)
which also recognise aﬃrmative duties of rescue but, to my knowledge, the point has not been
settled by their courts. The Scottish case of A v. B’s Trustees (1906) 13 S.L.T. 830 allowed a
claim in very similar circumstances but the successful claim has been generally seen to be
based on breach of contract. See Lord Johnston’s words at p. 831, apparently thus interpreted
by Lord Porter in Bourhill v. Young [1943] A.C. 92 at p. 120. In Reg. v. Criminal Injuries
Compensation Board, Ex parte Webb [1986] Q.B. 184, 196, Watkins L.J. also appeared to take
the view that a ‘‘person attempting to commit suicide may well be in breach of a duty of care
owed to [others]’’. But the observation was obiter; and in Greatorex Cazalet J. brushed the
point aside as irrelevant on the facts before him. An American case has, however, held that a
mentally distressed man who tried to commit suicide in his garage is under a duty towards his
son who came to his rescue and was, in the process, physically injured: Talbert v. Talbert 199
N.Y.S. 2d 212 (1960).
17 But see Handford’s note, cited in footnote 4 above. In English law, the most interesting obiter
dicta come from Lord Oliver’s opinion in Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police
[1992] 1 A.C. 310, 418.
18 441 P. 2d 912 (1968). In Dillon the majority, at p. 916, asked the question whether the
contributory negligence of the victim and the plaintiﬀs should aﬀect their claims; whereas the
minority, at p. 928, asked the very diﬀerent question whether the deceased child’s negligence
can aﬀect the living plaintiﬀs’ claims.
C.L.J. Foreign Law Inspiring National Law 391
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or companionship’’ or loss of ‘‘parental or children’s
companionship’’.19 In all these triangular situations the same range
of legal suits is possible and the abbreviations adopted in this paper
(P, D1, D2) are equally appropriate to them, as well. The lessons
that can be drawn from the many consortium cases are not
insigniﬁcant and we shall return to them later, especially in the
light of the paucity of the existing English material and the
complexity of the German.
Since all negligence reasoning starts with a discussion of the
notion of duty of care, Greatorex naturally had to grapple with the
question whether a victim of self-inﬂicted injuries owes a duty of
care to a third party not to cause him psychiatric injury. As stated,
Cazalet J. acknowledged that there was no binding authority on the
question of duty. For guidance he was thus directed to German
law, among other systems; and his conclusion was, undoubtedly,
inﬂuenced by the decision of the German Federal Supreme Court of
11 May 1971,20 cited to him by counsel for the Motor Insurers’
Bureau, which had been joined as second defendants since D2 was
not insured while driving the car.21 It will be recalled that to the
question now asked by Cazalet J. the BGH had given a negative
reply. In the opinion of the Federal Court the imposition of such a
duty would unduly restrict the person’s (D2’s) right to self-
determination (though we have noted that an exception might have
to be considered where the suicide was committed in a ‘‘deliberately
shocking manner’’). Cazalet J. expressly followed the reasoning of
the BGH and regarded the argument derived from the right to self-
determination as enunciated in the German case as ‘‘powerful’’.22
Matters would be diﬀerent where, by harming himself, D2 causes
damage other than nervous shock to another person. It would thus
seem that in German23 as well as Scottish24 and possibly English
law, the ethical duty not to harm oneself becomes a legal duty as
soon as the self-harming activity also causes physical harm to
another person. From this perspective D2’s immunity from liability
19 In Germany, we have noted that the rescue variant has been considered in the context of
suicide. Since loss of consortium claims are not known in German law, the most litigated type
of American case ﬁnds no parallel in Germany.
20 BGHZ 56, 163.
21 The owner of the car was also joined as a defendant by the second defendants—the MIB—on
the grounds that he had allowed his friend, the ﬁrst defendant (D2), to drive the car without
insurance. But neither the owner of the car nor the ﬁrst defendant appeared in court or were
represented by counsel.
22 See also the Law Commission’s report on Liability for Psychiatric Illness (1998) (Law Com
No. 249) para. [5.34]–[5.44].
23 Similarly, in BGH ZIP 1990, 1485, the court held that as a general rule a lessor did not owe a
contractual duty to the lessee not to commit suicide and as a result the estate was not
answerable for the termination of the lease. To impose such a duty would have amounted to
an unjustiﬁable intrusion upon the right to self-determination of the lessor.
24 See A v. B’s Trustees (1906) 13 S.L.T. 830.
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for nervous shock (suﬀered by others) constitutes an exception. In
other words, D2’s right to self-determination prevails only if we
regard this injury as special. Cazalet J.’s constant reference to
‘‘policy’’ lends credence to this view and illustrates, once again, our
legal system’s diﬃculty to cope with the ramiﬁcation of nervous
shock and emotional injuries.
IV. UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS
In the German decision one of the issues that had to be decided by
the court was whether the contributory negligence of D2 could be
imputed to P and her claim for damages against D1 accordingly
reduced. At this stage it is helpful to reconsider the argument in
favour of imputing D2s contributory negligence to P in the light of
Cazalet J.’s analysis of the ‘‘primary victim’s’’ (i.e. D2’s) limited or
non-existent liability to others for causing harm to himself. For the
two issues are interrelated.
The rationale seems to be this. If, generally speaking, a person
(D2) does not owe to others (P) a duty of care not to harm
himself, then it would appear to be fair that, if a third person (D1)
causes physical injury to D2, then D2 should bear his, the primary
victim’s, causal contribution to the accident. As in America so in
Germany, this problem has occurred also in other contexts of
adjustment among multiple ‘‘debtors’’ and the BGH has (not
always consistently) applied similar considerations.25 Because of
special circumstances, characteristic of the relationship between D2
and P, P does not have a cause of action against D2 (all other
conditions of liability being fulﬁlled). In the nervous shock case this
is because such a cause of action would be contrary to D2’s right
to self-determination.26 The result is that D2 is no longer seen as a
Mitschuldner ( joint debtor) with D1 since he is immune to any
action by P. This immunity (or privilege) enjoyed by D2 by virtue
of his relationship with P ‘‘distorts’’ the normal rules which apply
to the internal relationship between joint tortfeasors and which
in general law largely follows the pattern of our own law.27
The Germans thus refer to this problem as gesto¨rter
Gesamtschuldnerausgleich, a sentence that could be rendered into
English as ‘‘disturbed internal settlement between joint debtors’’.
The composite word is typically Germanic, and even awkward; but
its emphasis on ‘‘distortion’’ and the ‘‘internal adjustment that has
to take place between two (possible) debtors’’ makes it clear what
25 Thus see BGH JR 1989, 60, and cf. BGHZ 12, 213.
26 Approximately the same considerations apply easily if we replace the legal immunity with an
exclusion clause contained in a contract between D2 and P.
27 See x 421 BGB.
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it is trying to address. This ‘‘distortion’’ of the internal relationship
between the possible two joint debtors (D1 and D2) because of the
rules that govern the relationship between D2 and P can, in terms
of contribution rules, be addressed in one of three ways. First, we
could say that P can sue D1 and D1 can then claim contribution
from D2. Alternatively, we can take the view that P can sue D1 for
all his loss but D1 cannot claim anything back from D2 because of
his privileged position. (That is why D2 is, in German law, often
referred as the privileged debtor). Finally we could adopt an
altogether diﬀerent rule namely say that P can sue D1 but only for
his share of P’s loss.
We see this unfolding in our case as P is forced to sue D1. If
D1 could subsequently claim contribution from the primary victim
(D2) then, in the end, D2 would be held liable for his causal
contribution to the accident.28 But this result of holding D2 liable
was, as we saw in the German judgment seen to be undesirable
(because of D2’s right to self-determination). So this avenue seems
to be blocked. Therefore, it is held that D1 cannot claim
contribution from D2 even if the latter was primarily responsible
for the accident.29 This result may follow logically the reasoning
just expounded. Nonetheless, many would regard it as
unsatisfactory. For it does not seem fair in such circumstances to
impose full liability on D1, especially if his contribution to the
harm was in terms of causation and fault very low and that of D2
very high.30 So in such circumstances why should D1 (rather than
P) bear D2’s causal contribution to the accident? After all, it is
because of special circumstances arising out of the relationship
between D2 and P, that D2 cannot be made liable for causing
nervous shock. It is therefore plausible to argue that the rationale
of x 846 BGB should also be applied to claims of secondary victims
(those we have called P’s) in respect of nervous shock and to
reduce, accordingly, P’s claim against D1. This implies that where
the D2 is solely answerable for the accident, P cannot recover at
all. We are thus back to our point of departure! Given the
special—one might say unusual—facts of Greatorex (for D2, the
primary victim, was solely responsible for his hurt) the point did
not have to be resolved in that case. But it could arise in other
contexts where the personal autonomy argument is not at play.
That is where the German ideas, complex though they are, could,
once again serve as a source of inspiration.
28 Albeit the risk of insolvency of the primary victim (D2) would be transferred from P to D1.
29 Cf. Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 A.C. 310, 418 per Lord
Oliver.
30 The point made by Lord Oliver, note 29 above, but rejected (obiter) by Cazalet J. in
Greatorex.
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So what will happen where the reason why D2 is not liable to P
is due to a family immunity rule such as that found in xx 1359 or
1664 I BGB which applies to all cases other than motor car
accidents?31 D1’s liability towards P is not in doubt. But will he
(D1) then be able to claim a contribution from D2? Or will D2’s
immunity, which protects him from actions by P, also shield him
from a contribution claim brought by D1? To this last question,
some fourteen years ago, the German Federal Court gave a positive
reply,32 reversing earlier case law33 and leaving German academic
opinion reeling with the unfairness of a result which means that D1
has to carry all the loss. This solution is even more confusing if
one bears in mind that the German courts take a diﬀerent view if
the reason of the immunity given to D2 is the result of a
contractual exemption clause that regulates his relationship with P.
For here, the courts allow P to claim his full loss from D1 and
then allow the latter to claim a contribution from D2 as a result of
an analogical application of x 426 BGB. To this variety of answers
we must add one more: German academics, almost in their entirety,
prefer a liability rule that limits D1’s liability to the amount of the
loss due to his fault and avoids all further actions. But in English
common law terms such a solution would be contrary to our joint
tortfeasors rule, which renders each joint tortfeasor liable for the
entire harm of the plaintiﬀ.34
This last-mentioned position does not seem to be the position
currently taken by most American courts. The loss of consortium
claims, frequently litigated in the United States, suggest another
approach very similar to that preferred by German academics (but
not German courts). Thus, the current tendency in the United
States seems to treat the claims of P (usually the wife) against D1
as being ‘‘independent’’, but to reduce them to take into account
the contributory negligence of the physically injured spouse (D2).35
31 As already stated, it is here that we ﬁnd an abundance of cases in the United States.
32 BGH 1 March 1988, BGHZ 103, 338, 346ﬀ. Palandt, Bu¨rgerliches Gesetzbuch, 60th ed.
Munich 2001, no. 426.
33 BGH 27 June 1961, BGHZ 35, 317, 323–324 (though this earlier case law may still apply to
other factual instances).
34 This may be the reason why, in the context of psychiatric injury the Law Commission took a
somewhat negative position. See Law Commission Report on Liability for Psychiatric Illness
(1998) (Law Com No. 249) para. [5.39]. But the Law Commission does not appear to have
considered the various alternatives canvassed in Germany on this point.
35 For a review of the case law, see Blagg v. Illinois F.W.D. Truck and Equipment Company 572
NE 2d, 920 (1991), with references at p. 925. See, also, Mallett v. Dunn [1949] 2 K.B. 180
(England); Feltch v. General Rental Co., 383 Mass. 603, 421 NE 2d 67 (1981), reviewing the
contradictory American case law, and Handeland v. Brown, 216 NW 2d 574 (Iowa, 1974)
where the conﬂicting views of the majority and the dissent repay careful reading and reveal
that many of the problems in US law may be linked with the diﬀering views adopted towards
contributory and comparative negligence. Imputed contributory negligence is discussed in
detail in Gregory, Kalven, and Epstein, 716ﬀ., especially 730ﬀ., and Harper, Fleming James Jr
and Gray, vol. II, ch. 8.8 and 8.9.
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Since the familial immunities—wherever they are recognised—mean
that P cannot sue D2 for his share to the accident, and since the
American courts have now, in their majority, come to accept that
the action against D1 is limited to his share of the loss,
contribution claims between D1 and D2 do not appear to be
prevalent.36 In practice this means that the usual rules of joint
tortfeasors (which entail that each of them is liable for the full
amount of the plaintiﬀ’s loss) are never brought into play—a
condition which would probably not be condoned by English law.
V. THE AMERICAN DIMENSION
The American dimension is interesting for a number of reasons. To
begin with the paucity of the English material has been noted. This
means that if we need guidance from within the common law we
must turn to the law in the United States since it is well known for
its richness. Strangely, the richness is there, though not in the
context of nervous shock claims such as the one we have been
considering in this essay. Nor, indeed, do we ﬁnd much guidance
within the context of rescue situations where, again, the same issues
may arise. (Rescuer/P in our example sues tortfeasor (D1) whose
fault caused rescuee’s (D2) injuries: can the rescuee’s fault (D2) be
put forward to reduce the damages due to the rescuer (P)?) But the
number of decisions found in consortium litigation is so numerous
that more than guidance can be found from the study of their
many pages. More precisely, what can be found are two things.
First is the lesson mentioned above, namely, that D1 pays but pays
only for his contribution to the plaintiﬀ’s loss. As stated, this is
diﬀerent from making him liable for everything and then leaving
him to assume the risk of obtaining a contribution from D2—the
other cause of the P’s loss. The American solution is thus not just
diﬀerent from the one adopted by German courts; it is also quite
close to that advocated by German academics. Clearly, future
English courts have a choice; and it is important to know the pros
and cons of each alternative. Once again, we will gain if we look
abroad for arguments on points, which we have not yet fully
36 For references see note 47 below. But like all such statements about American law this, too,
has to be qualiﬁed by mentioning the fact that decisions do exist suggesting that the tortfeasor
(main defendant) can sue the primary victim for his share of the plaintiﬀ’s harm. See, for
instance, American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court 20 Cal. 3r 578, 591, 578 P. 2d 899
(1978); Lantis v. Condon 95 Cal. App. 3r 152, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1979). The Lantis facts, with
the primary victim being 80 per cent. responsible for his injuries, illustrate the need to shield
the tortfeasor from the risk of carrying the entire loss. But as stated in the text, the solution
of sharing the cost with the primary victim may not be the best since it, essentially, defeats
any immunity that the law (or contract) may have given him towards the secondary victim.
For an American case that makes precisely this point see: Feltch v. General Rental Co. 421 NE
2d 67, 92 (1981, Mass).
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addressed. And they should be that much easier to evaluate now
that we have tried to set the Greatorex discussion against a wider
canvass. Bit by bit the puzzle pieces fall into place.
But the American cases also hold a further lesson for the
foreign observer. Quite simply, they illustrate that the law is a
seamless web. In the United States the answer given to our
question is to a large extent determined by the rules that obtain in
other parts of the law of torts. In our type of cases what type of
rule any particular State adopts towards (a) contributory
negligence, (b) joint tortfeasors, and (c) family immunities will
inﬂuence the solution adopted. The realisation that the law is a
seamless web is a valuable one for both the student and the
practitioner. The diﬃculties the coincidence of these rules gives rise
to, however, also provide a salutary warning about the dangers of
comparative law.
Take the well-known case of Handeland v. Brown.37 It’s a
decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa dated 27 March 1974. The
main action involved the loss of consortium claims brought by the
father (P) of a young motorcyclist (D2) injured in a traﬃc accident
as a result of a collision with a motor vehicle (D1) at a road
intersection. The jury entered a verdict for D1, rejecting the young
man’s (D2) claim because of his own negligence. The plaintiﬀ
father requested an instruction to the eﬀect that his son’s (D2’s)
negligence could not be imputed to him, P, but the jury again
found for D1. The father (P) appealed and the Supreme Court of
Iowa was thus concerned only with this claim. The appeal was
successful.
What strikes the reader of this decision is how focused was the
majority judgment in its attempts to reject the argument that the
father’s (P) action was derivative. Like other courts before it, the
Iowa court was keen to show that ‘‘the gist of the parental action
. . . is a wrong done to the parent [P] in consequence of injury to
his child [D2] by the actionable negligence of another [D1].’’38 The
result was that the damages claimable would not/should not be
reduced to take into account the child’s (D2’s) fault. An interesting
dissent questioned this view to the extent that it would allow a
parent (P) of a child (D2) injured largely by its own fault to claim
full damages from the tortfeasor (D1) whose fault had, say,
contributed, only 10 per cent. to the child’s harm. It is only here,
in a mere three lines,39 that we ﬁnd any reference to contributory
37 216 NW 2d 574 (1974).
38 Ibid., at p. 578.
39 ‘‘Such a result seems unjust. Application of comparative negligence would most adequately
rectify the injustice, but we do not have comparative negligence in such cases.’’ I have
deliberately italicised the last few words of the quotation because to a foreign reader they
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negligence rule as a possible reason for this construction. But this
sentence, almost a throwaway line, made my American students
and me review the judgment and the law in Iowa at the time of the
Handeland decision. And the prevailing rule then was the old rule
of contributory negligence. If that had been applied without more
in Handeland the court would have been compelled to reject the
father’s claim as being contaminated by his son’s fault.
Seen in this light, the decision is thus not really about whether
the parents’ claim is independent (which it is) or derivative, but
how one can ensure that it be not defeated by the child’s fault and
the old rule about contributory negligence. The problem with such
an interpretation, however, is that (a) though it is arguably the true
reason for the judgment, it ﬁnds few clues in the majority opinion
to support it, and (b) if few students or practitioners—at any rate
foreigners—notice this, much eﬀort will be diverted towards
arguing whether the claim is independent or derivative. This is an
arid attempt to deﬁne an essentially meaningless term. Yet the size
of the American literature and the pages found in American
decisional law on this subject,40 suggest that even American lawyers
have fallen into this trap and carried out the deﬁnitional debate.
Another case that had proceeded in precisely the same manner
had been Rollins v. General American Transportation Corp.41 There,
too, the court was confronted by two actions: one by a physically
injured man (D2), who had contributed through his negligence to
his hurt; and the other a consortium claim by his spouse (P). Both
were rejected, because of the fault of the primary victim (D2). In
that case also the discussion had centred on the independent or
derivative nature of the spouses (P’s) claim, saying little of the real
issue that must have worried the court. The reasoning was, yet
again, essentially adopted in Plocar v. Dunkin’s Donuts of America
Inc.,42 another loss of consortium case. But by now Illinois, as most
States in the late 1970s and 1980s, was moving towards the
comparative negligence rule.43 But our cases missed the signiﬁcance
of the shift, perhaps because the consortium rule had never been
openly linked to the contributory negligence rule but had, instead,
seem to be confusing insofar as they imply that in the early 1970s Iowa knew the rule of
comparative negligence in other types of cases. So far as I know, this was not the case, so the
end of the judicial dictum seems unfortunately phrased.
40 Conveniently collected in ALR 4th, vol 25. Michael DiSabatino, the author of the annotation,
thus remarks on page 9: ‘‘The reason most often advanced for denying a spouse or parent
recovery for loss of consortium where the physically injured spouse or child has been
contributorily negligent is that the consortium action is derived from the physically injured
spouse or child’s cause of action. . .’’(Italics supplied.) The ALR annotation is up to date to
September 2000.
41 46 Ill App. 2d 266, 197 NE 2d 68 (1964).
42 103 Ill. App. 3rd 740, 748, 431 NE 2d 1175.
43 Alvis v. Ribar 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 NE 2d 886 (1981).
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been obscured by the debate over the independent or derivative
nature of the claim. Then, ten years later, came Blagg v. Illinois
F.W.D. Truck and Equipment Company;44 and the court had to
revisit the consortium rule. Happily it did; and did so in an open
way when it said:
The aforementioned cases [Rollins and Plocar] . . . were decided
prior to Alvis and thus were based on contributory negligence
principles. Today the absolute bar to recovery for loss of
consortium that formerly existed must be reviewed under
comparative negligence principles. . .
The result of the change, however, was obvious; and in line with
the bulk of American States45 where ‘‘the loss of consortium award
[is] reduced by the comparative negligence of the physically injured
spouse.’’ To re-assert what had thus far been kept (almost) under
wraps, the court concluded with the statement:
The Alvis decision, and the advent of comparative negligence
principles, has subsequently reduced the harsh eﬀects of
contributory negligence by the physically injured spouse, as the
loss-of-consortium plaintiﬀ is no longer barred from recovery.46
The discussion about independent or derivative claims is thus
now for all intents and purposes de´passe´. So, if this were the only
lesson to be derived from these American decisions, it would be of
limited value. On the educational front, its interest would lie in the
need to remind students (and sometimes practitioners) that the
answer in one part of the law (consortium claims) is determined by
the position adopted in another ( joint tortfeasors rules). On the
practical front, however, the lesson derived from these decisions
remains valid if deﬁnitively unresolved. And it consists in the
decision de facto to set aside the rules about joint tortfeasors and,
as already stated, reduce P’s entitlement against D1 by the
comparative negligence of D2.47 To English (and Continental
European) eyes this may look like a replacement of the ‘‘full
liability’’ that applies to joint tortfeasors by a ‘‘proportionality
rule’’. But, given that in this case there is a special relationship
44 143 Ill. 2d 188, 572 NE 2d 920 (1991).
45 Conveniently collected by the court at page 925 of its judgment.
46 Ibid., at p. 926. A similar statement, signiﬁcantly tucked away in a footnote, can be found in
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado in Lee v. Colorado Department of Health 718
P. 2d 221, 231, text and note 8. (Colo. 1986).
47 See, for instance: Eggert v. Working 599 P. 2d. 1389 (Alaska 1979); Turnbow v. Wasden 608 F.
Supp. 237 (D. Nev. 1985); Lee v. Colorado Department of Health 718 P. 2d 221 (Colo. 1986);
Quadrone v. Pasco Petroleum Co. 156 Ariz. 415, 752 P. 2d 504. (1988); Blagg v. Illinois F.W.D.
Truck and Equipment Company 572 NE 2d 920 (Ill. 1991). But cf. the cases cited in note 36
above.
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between plaintiﬀ and primary victim, the departure from the rule
may be justiﬁed.48
VI. SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS
Some academics in this country—notably Sir Roy Goode—have
preached all their lives the case for a closer co-operation between
judges, practitioners, and academics. I was converted to this creed
some twenty years ago, and have since tried to apply it to the
study and comparison of legal systems. How well it can work can
be seen by Greatorex; and this for a number of reasons. Here are
eight.
First, German law inﬂuenced the English decision because a
practitioner—counsel for the MIB—used its ideas to construct his
own argument before the English court. The practitioner was, in
turn, able to access and evaluate positively this foreign material
because it was made available to him by an academic lawyer in a
form that was useable on this side of the Channel. This,
incidentally, may also explain why German (instead of French or
Italian law) served here as a model: no French or Italian material
on the subject is available in English so the experience of neither of
these systems could be used as a source of ideas.
Secondly, German law became attractive because it was served
to the English ‘‘consumers’’ in an easily digestible way. For the
material came in the form of a judicial decision which had litigated
facts that bore considerable resemblance to those of the English
litigation and thus cried out for comparison to all but the most
narrow-minded. Luck determines the outcome of every human
enterprise; and as luck would have it, the protagonists in the
Greatorex case were willing to take ideas irrespective of their
national origin. But there is no denying the fact that another
counsel or another judge might not have been so diligent in his
research or open-minded towards foreign products.
Thirdly, in Greatorex luck favoured the comparatist in yet
another way. The inspiration or transplantation of the foreign
thinking was not hindered by one of those Germanic terms that are
untranslatable and thus so oﬀ-putting to those unaccustomed to the
demands that the Germanic culture makes on the intellect of the
potential borrower! To be sure, as the theory of ‘‘transferred loss’’
shows (in German: Schadensverlagerung), even such notions,
provided that they are intrinsically valuable, can penetrate a foreign
48 The shift from the full liability to a ‘‘proportional liability’’ rule was considered and rejected
by the Law Commission in a paper it did in 1966 for the DTI entitled Feasibility Investigation
of Joint and Several Liability.
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legal system. Some help from academic quarters can, again, help
overcome problems associated with their abstract nature. If another
illustration is needed, think of Drittwirkung. Ten years ago there
was hardly an English lawyer who was alive to the problem let
alone the concept. Now, the literature it is generating is almost
excessive. But let us return to the German decision. There the
Federal Court had refused to hold that a person was under a duty
not to injure or kill himself since such a duty would infringe his
autonomy.49 Such language could easily slide into the English legal
reasoning as it began its search for a duty of care as a basis for a
tortious obligation to make amends. Indeed, reading Greatorex one
is left with the feeling that it did so without any jarring—linguistic
or conceptual. This is an immensely signiﬁcant observation for
anyone translating foreign legal documents and then hoping to use
them in our courts.
Yet, fourthly, the English court looked only at one side of
German law; indeed, it could not have done more since counsel
drew the judge’s attention to the German decision but nothing
more. The English court was thus not made aware that the German
result might, in some instances, have also been reached by utilising
the immunity conferred by x 1359 BGB.50 This alludes to the policy
reasons, which also weighed heavily in Cazalet J.’s mind (family
relationships) and militate against allowing a legal action. Why did
the German court refuse to go down that path? We can only
speculate; but at least three reasons spring to the mind of an
outside observer. First, as already stated, x 1359 BGB does not
apply to car accident cases for the reasons that we know from our
law as well. Secondly, the accident in the 1971 nervous shock case
was caused by D2’s gross negligence and this would have defeated
the immunity given by x 1359 BGB. Finally, the court might have
wished to create in such cases an immunity that went beyond the
family relationships covered by x 1359 BGB.51 If it did, the result
would be that facts such as those encountered in the Australian
49 It will be remembered from note 13 above that x 1359 BGB could, in some instances, have
served as another way of ensuring the immunity of D2 towards P, this immunity being based
on the policy reasons appropriate to the D2/P relationship. These reasons ﬁgured in Cazalet
J.’s judgment; but not in the German judgment, which chose to justify the non-liability rule
by reference to human autonomy. One (further) consequence of this justiﬁcation is that it
ensures that the non-liability rule applies even where there is no family relationship between
D2 and P. This is exactly what happened in the Australian case of FAI General Insurance Co.
v. Lucre [2000] N.S.W.C.A. 346; and the verdict there was for the plaintiﬀ.
50 See note 13 above. There is a problem, however, with the immunity rule contained in x 1359
BGB: its application depends on the status of marriage and not the closeness of the
relationship between P and D2.
51 My German friends, however, warn me that this is not the kind of reasoning that would
appeal to a German judge.
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case FAI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Lucre52 would receive the
same answer: no duty and hence no liability. Since Greatorex
followed the (wider) court reasoning, does the same result now hold
true for English law? Would a claim by P, who was unrelated to
D2, likewise fail? On the other hand, would the outcome be
aﬀected by the fact that Cazalet J.’s policy points would be
inapplicable to my hypothetical? Greatorex, as we keep saying, has
left a number of points open, even though it has done a good job
in alerting us to new ways of looking at them. If the Germans have
discovered too many (subtly diﬀerent) ways of solving this problem
we, in England, have not even addressed it!
Fifthly, all of the above could not have been undertaken, and
the chances of the German ideas inﬂuencing the case would have
been slim, had the attempt at legal borrowing gone through Codes
or academic writings. For even the briefest consultation of the
German treatises reveals the discussion in Germany to be
theoretical and conceptual in the extreme.53 Had English counsel
chosen that course he would have found it bewildering both to
himself and to the court. The fact that parts of German law were
still left unused and unexplored does not matter. Further research
may produce even more fruits next time around.
Sixthly, the above would not, of course, preclude recourse to
American law as an alternative source of inspiration. But here,
again, without appropriate academic preparation, the American
material might reveal only part of the picture and thus make
suitable inspiration dubious. If the hint that our highest courts can
manage American law without the occasional assistance of
academics were to be seen as disrespectful towards them, one must
remind the reader how the House of Lords in Murphy54
‘‘misunderstood’’ the law in the United States. It was a
cosmopolitan judge55 who pointed this out in no uncertain terms in
an academic article; and, as fate would have it, he was later to join
their lordships as a judge. The moral of this is that the fact that
foreign legal material is accessible to us in linguistic terms does not
mean that it can be transplanted into our system without thought,
caution, and preparation. In my view we are on the verge of
52 [2000] N.S.W.C.A. 346 (decision of 29 November 2000). In the Australian case the car
accident between D1 and D2 was, again, entirely due to D2’s fault. In this case, however,
there was no family or other relationship between P and D2; P’s claim for his post-traumatic
stress disorder succeeded.
53 For instance Larenz Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts, I, 13th edn. (Munich 1982) x 37; Thiele,
Gesamtschuld und Gesamtschuldnerausgleich, JuS 68, 149; Medicus, Haftungsbefreiung und
Gesamtschuldnerausgleich, JZ 67, 398; Medicus, Schuldrecht I, Allgemeiner Teil, 10th ed.
(Munich 1998), Rn. 793.
54 [1991] 1 A.C. 398.
55 Sir Robin (now Lord) Cooke in his ‘‘An Impossible Distinction’’ (1991) 107 L.Q.R. 46ﬀ.
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forgetting this warning if we go on looking at the theology of the
First Amendment in an uncritical manner. But that is for another
day!
The seventh point places the case against the wider
contemporary discussions about comparative law. Its literature is
growing; and Europe, one way or another, is the greatest stimulus.
Directives, case law from Luxembourg and Strasbourg, private
initiatives to formulate general principles (or soft law as it is
sometimes called): we have it all these days. And yet at the lowest
level of a single case that could arise in any country of the so-
called western world, we ﬁnd an illustration which shows how types
of reasoning can travel easily if they are packaged in user-friendly
ways to those that matter and solve practical problems. Our
example also shows that some systems have studied the underlying
issues more deeply than others. In this instance, the Germans were
ahead of the English (though their thought processess are highly
complex). On a diﬀerent matter, for instance a problem of
commercial law such as securitisation, English law might be seen to
be more ﬂexible than, say, its French counterpart. The borrowing
at speciﬁc, pragmatic levels might not have the allure that comes
with grand theories; but Greatorex suggests that the methodology
here advocated not only works: it works well enough to oﬀer an
eﬃcient springboard for further study and understanding of foreign
law. And at this stage the endeavour is not only a practical one; it
also acquires a worthwhile intellectual component.
Finally, has the work started by Greatorex come to a
conclusion? We have already alluded to the fact that the point
seems to be open if in the next case P and D2 are not related.
German academics also seem to be divided as to ambit of the 1988
decision56 which decided the contribution claim between tortfeasors
and, it will be remembered, held that D1 had to carry all the cost
to P.57 The successful completion of the work started by Cazalet J.
might, once again, be aided by the proper consideration of foreign
law. This is the eighth and last point that emerges from Greatorex.
For though the case made a good start in addressing the complex
kind of legal problems that arise in these triangular situations, it
did not completely ﬁnish the job it started. The tail end of the
judgment, where the extent of liability of the potential defendant is
considered, is thus notably ‘‘hurried’’ and the only legitimate and
convincing explanation one can oﬀer for this is that the resolution
56 BGHZ 103, 338.
57 Contrary to the early decision of BGHZ 35, 317 which had allowed D1 to claim a
contribution against D2. It must be remembered that BGHZ 56, 163—the 1971 nervous shock
case that guided the English decision—was decided against the background of BGHZ 35, 317
decided in 1961.
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of this problem was not necessary to the facts of Greatorex. Future
courts will thus have to consider whether the same rules apply to
cases where D2 is, for other reasons, immune to an action from the
secondary victim or, alternatively, protected by an exemption
clause.58 More importantly, our courts will also have to mull over
the question whether it is better to allow P to sue D1 for all the
loss (and then leave it to D1 to obtain contribution from D2 if he
can) or only obtain from D1 the amount which is due to his share
of the blame. This writer’s preference is for the second option,
which is also favoured by German academe and many of the more
recent American decisions, i.e. ‘‘proportional liability.’’ But the
study of German and American law also suggests that there are
other solutions (though the theoretical merits of each option seem
to have been studied only by German academics). In the light of
the above, the English practitioner can only beneﬁt by dwelling
further on foreign, especially German, law. And if this time the dip
is into complex German theory and not just case law, it can at least
be done with greater conﬁdence since Greatorex has successfully
broken new ground in the area of comparative law in English
courts. To put it diﬀerently and in wider terms, the comparative
approach to common problems rarely if ever runs out of interesting
variations, disproving the narrow-minded conviction of many
national lawyers that theirs is the only way of doing things. But if
one translated case can give rise to so much thought, imagine what
could happen if the other one hundred and ﬁfty decisions found in
the same book were subjected to the same kind of scrutiny in
search for new ideas and directions. The author of the book, if no
one else, must surely be allowed the hope that this may happen.
58 Which was not the case in Greatorex but was considered by the German Federal Court in
BGHZ 12, 213; NJW 1972, 942.
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